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Abstract 
Automaticity is widely assumed to reflect hard-wired tendencies or the outcome of prior practice.  
Recent research on automatic effects of instructions (AEI), however, indicates that newly instructed 
tasks can become immediately automatic without ever been practiced. This research shows that the 
representations underlying AEI need not always be directly linked to an overt response, must be highly 
accessible for future use, and involve bi-directional links between stimuli and responses.  AEI was also 
found to reduce with increasing intellectual abilities among young adults and from childhood to young 
adulthood, possibly due to improved abstract cognitive control. We argue that AEI effects are based on 
the unintentional retrieval of episodic memories that encode instructions. 
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Powerful Instructions: Automaticity without Practice 
We often behave and think automatically, that is, quickly and effortlessly, without the intention 
to think or behave in that way. Automaticity liberates attention (e.g., allows one to engage in a 
conversation with a passenger while driving) and frees us from the need to make online choices by 
relying on choices made beforehand.  Research suggests that processes can be automatic in different 
ways (Bargh, 1992; Logan, 1985; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), leading some researchers to abandon an 
“all-or-none” view of automaticity (Bargh, 1992; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). From this perspective, it 
only makes sense to regard processes as automatic with reference to specific features (e.g., automatic in 
the sense of unintentional). Despite this change in perspective, there remains a prevalent assumption 
that automatic behavior reflects either hard-wired processes (e.g., when gazing towards an abrupt 
stimulus onset) or over-training (e.g., when reading words; Logan, 1985). In this paper, we review recent 
research on automatic effects of instructions (AEI), a phenomenon that challenges this prevalent 
assumption by showing evidence for unintentional activation of completely new tasks that had just been 
instructed and are neither hard-wired, nor practiced.  This research continues previous efforts beginning 
already in the first half of the 20th century (Hommel, 2000, for review).  
The relevance of AEI extends beyond automaticity because it highlights an important 
consequence of the evolution of communication and language that characterize our species.  
Specifically, AEI shows the potency of instructions (of immediately causing automaticity) when 
instructions are exchanged on the fly, improving teamwork  efficiency, as required by our ancestors 
when hunting in teams, for example.  The modern counterparts of these tasks include police chases and 
moving large pieces of furniture up the stairway.   Additionally, this research may change our views of 
intentionality and moral responsibility, showing that (in some cases), when the intention to carry out an 
act is made ahead of the act, the online involvement of intentional control may be reduced.  Finally, AEI 
may be viewed as the short-term counterpart of prospective memory tasks, where pending intentions 
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have been shown to unintentionally activate related contents (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), and where 
concrete if-then action plans, or “implementation intentions” were shown to boost performance 
(Gollwitzer, 1999).  Yet, prospective memory tasks regard actions that may have been performed 
beforehand and are to be performed in the relatively distant future (e.g., remember taking the pill 
tonight), whereas AEI-tasks are novel and regard the near-immediate future (e.g., warning a teammate 
regarding an unexpected obstacle).   
Recently Introduced Techniques to Study AEI 
Prior research (e.g., Cohen-Kdoshay & Meiran, 2007; De Houwer, Beckers, Vandorpe, & Custers, 
2005; Wenke, Gaschler, & Nattkemper, 2007) revealed phenomena that are somewhat inconclusive 
with respect to whether they represent AEI (Meiran, Pereg, Kessler, Cole, & Braver, 2015b), making it 
important to ask what criteria should a successful demonstration of AEI meet?  We suggest that AEI 
must be observed in novel action-related instructions that have not yet been executed overtly (to rule 
out the involvement of prior practice), and should indicate unintentional execution (to meet this 
criterion for automaticity).  Below we review two relatively recent lines of research with two different 
paradigms, both yielding evidence for AEI that meets these requirements.  Both paradigms have in 
common an experimental design involving many different novel tasks, each instructed and then 
(typically) executed once or twice, before moving to the next task.  
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(a)                                                                                                                        (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.(a) The inducer-diagnostic (ID) procedure ( Liefooghe et al., 2012). Each run involved new 
stimulus-response instructions (those in the figure are just one example) followed by a variable number of 
diagnostic (font decision) trials, and ending with a single inducer probe trial in which the new 
instructions were implemented for the first and only time. (b) Diagnostic-task results (N=166, 
RT=reaction-time, PE=proportion of errors) indicate poorer font decision performance when 
the response was incompatible with the instructed task, showing that the newly instructed task 
rules were retrieved unintentionally. 
The Inducer-Diagnostic (ID) design was introduced by Liefooghe, Wenke, and De Houwer (2012, 
Figure 1a), who presented participants with different runs of trials. On each run, two tasks had to be 
performed: the inducer task and the diagnostic task. Both tasks shared the same stimuli and responses, 
but employed a different decision rule.  At the start of each run, two new arbitrary stimulus-response 
rules of the inducer task were presented (e.g., ‘X’left; ‘Y’ right). After the instructions, there were 
several diagnostic trials in which participants made font decisions (e.g., uprightleft; italic right). 
During the last phase of the run, the inducer task was implemented for the first (and only) time.  
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Liefooghe et al. (2012) observed that performance in the diagnostic (font decision) task was impaired 
when the correct response mismatched with the inducer instructions (e.g., ‘X’ presented in italics, Figure 
1b), indicating an “instruction-based congruency effect”. The fact that the diagnostic task was 
performed prior to the first overt execution of the inducer instructions supports the conclusion that the 
aforementioned effect reflects AEI. 
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(a) 
 
(b)  (c) 
Figure 2.  (a) The NEXT paradigm (Meiran et al., 2015) involved instructions regarding 
the GO phase (“X” and “Y” are just one example), a NEXT phase involving advancing to the 
next screen by pressing a fixed key (0-5 trials) and instruction application (GO phase, 2 trials).  
NEXT responses were either compatible (e.g., “X”) or incompatible (e.g.,“Y”) with the 
instructed GO phase response. (b) NEXT results (RT as a function of NEXT Trial Number, N) 
showing slower screen advancement responses to stimuli whose instructed response mismatched 
the NEXT response, and (c) GO results, showing better first than second GO response (N=167; 
RT=reaction-time, PE=Proportion of errors). 
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The NEXT task was introduced by Meiran et al. (2015b), Figure 2a). Like the ID, NEXT involved 
runs (“miniblocks”), each beginning with stimulus-response instructions of a new inducer (GO) task, with 
unique stimuli mapped to key presses, and a very simple diagnostic (NEXT) task that required advancing 
to the next screen with a fixed response.  A core finding is the NEXT effect (an AEI marker): slower NEXT 
responses in incompatible trials.  The NEXT paradigm thus involves a simpler diagnostic task than the ID.  
Furthermore, this diagnostic task is not described as a task at all, and thus does not involve any choice 
(beyond the choice to advance to the next screen and not to execute the GO task). Furthermore, unlike 
the studies using the ID paradigm that had so far reported results pooled across all the diagnostic trials, 
reports from studies using the NEXT paradigm examined the influence of the sequential positioning of 
the NEXT trial (Figure 2b) and GO trial (Figure 2c).  This made it possible to examine AEI already in the 
first NEXT trial coming immediately after the instructions.  The presence of AEI in the first NEXT trial thus 
enabled ruling out the possible involvement of prior (covert) practice that could take place in the course 
of the diagnostic task.   
Importantly, the NEXT effect was numerically largest in the first NEXT trial in all the experiments 
run so far (see Figure 2b, showing NEXT reaction times according to Compatibility and the sequential 
position of the NEXT trial within the miniblock, N).  This finding implies that the congruence effect 
observed in the ID paradigm (Liefooghe et al., 2012) is (a) probably an underestimation given that it 
includes all NEXT trials, and (b) provides a trustworthy index of AEI because it is unlikely to reflect 
automaticity that was built up as a result of prior practice.  An additional finding in the NEXT paradigm is 
the GO-Trial effect indicating a relatively slow and inaccurate first response compared to second GO 
response.    
 What have we Learned about AEI? 
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Results from studies using the two paradigms show that AEI depends to some degree on having 
an intention to successfully execute the instructed plan.  For example, Liefooghe et al. (2012) showed 
that AEI is reduced to non-significant levels when participants were required to memorize the 
instructions for later recognition instead of actual execution. Along a similar line, Liefooghe, De Houwer, 
and Wenke (2013) demonstrated that AEI depends on the degree by which participants actively prepare 
for the inducer task.  Similarly, the NEXT effect was sustained throughout the NEXT phase only when 
participants were strongly encouraged to maintain high readiness to execute the instructions (very little 
opportunity, 2 trials, was given to demonstrate success), while the NEXT effect faded quickly during the 
NEXT phase when readiness was less strongly emphasized (10 GO trials, allowing participants not to 
prepare and use practice; Meiran et al., 2015).   
Does AEI reflect an unintended activation of a motor plan?  Meiran et al. (2015) showed that the 
NEXT effect is primarily due to slowing in incompatible NEXT trials (as compared to neutral NEXT trials 
involving stimuli that were not been linked to any response).  This incompatibility-related slowing shows 
unintentional retrieval of the competing response (e.g., the left key in Figure 2a).   More directly, 
Everaert, Theeuwes, Liefooghe, and De Houwer (2014) observed that the brain lateralized readiness 
potential (reflecting activation of the motor plan) deflected in the direction of the response tendency 
that corresponded with the instructed SR mappings of the inducer task.  Meiran, Pereg, Kessler, Cole 
and Braver (2015a) took this finding one step further by requiring participants to withhold responding 
altogether during the NEXT phase.  Their rationale was that, when there is a diagnostic task, reflexivity is 
not full-blown because a critical component, action initiation, is actually intended because it is involved 
in the diagnostic task.  Lateralized readiness potential results show that stimuli presented in the NEXT 
phase activated the motor cortex that corresponded to the instructed response.  Aside from providing a 
conceptual replication of Everaert et al., the results provide evidence that newly instructed rules can 
also be initiated reflexively.   
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Studies suggest that, unlike practice-based automaticity, AEI reflects rather abstract codes in 
that they are found also when the inducer and the diagnostic task overlap only at the conceptual level 
(e.g., pressing left vs. saying ‘left’, Liefooghe et al., 2012, and object names vs. pictures, Tibboel, 
Liefooghe, & Houwer, 2016). In another study, Theeuwes, Eder, De Houwer, and Liefooghe (2015) 
examined the direction of the effects of instructions. Specifically, they presented new Response-Effect 
(RE) contingencies at the start of each run (e.g., “if you press the left key, the letter Q will appear on the 
screen”, i.e., leftQ, and similarly rightP). These contingencies were probed at the end of each run 
(i.e., inducer task) by having participants add a missing letter (e.g., ‘P’) to a display by pressing e.g., the 
right key.  Results showed significant RE congruency effects (quicker font decisions to stimuli that were 
expected to be produced by a given response according to the instructions), suggesting that the RE 
instructions allowed for backward activation of responses by the effect stimuli (e.g., Q, R).  Braem, 
Liefooghe, De Houwer, Brass, and Abrahamse (2017) showed that instructions have automatic effects 
even when the diagnostic task is presented in a different context (screen location) than the instructions 
and the inducer task.  Last, AEI can involve abstract rules and not be restricted to stimulus-response 
rules. Specifically, Meiran and Pereg (2017) instructed participants which one of two familiar tasks to 
execute by means of a newly instructed task-cue (e.g., the picture of a piano cued an up-vs.-down 
judgement of stimulus location) that changed between miniblocks. Hence, the instructions in this case 
linked a newly introduced stimulus and a familiar task.  Results show that when this task-cue (e.g., the 
piano picture) was presented in a tailored diagnostic task where its identity was irrelevant, it 
nonetheless retrieved of the associated task.  
AEI shows surprising individual differences and developmental trends.  Meiran, Pereg, Givon, 
Danieli, and Shahar (2016) found that, predictably, participants high in procedural working memory, 
mental speed and fluid intelligence were better prepared to execute the GO phase.  Surprisingly, 
participants with better mental speed and better GO task preparedness had relatively small NEXT 
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compatibility effects.  Using a child-adapted version of the NEXT paradigm, Verbruggen, McLaren, Pereg, 
& Meiran (2016) found that the difference between younger (4-11 yo) and older (17-19 yo) kids 
resembles the aforementioned differences between high ability and low-ability young adults.  Possibly, 
these findings relate to the ability to represent the task hierarchically, enabling action deferral until 
certain branching conditions are met (here, the initiation of the inducer task, Cole, Meiran, & Braver, in 
press, see also Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003). 
Conclusions 
There can now be little doubt that AEI exist. We also learned that the representations 
underlying AEI need not always be directly linked to an overt response, must be highly accessible for 
future use, and involve bi-directional links between stimuli and responses.  Furthermore, we discovered 
that AEI reduces from childhood to young adulthood and with increasing ability among young adults. 
If automatic effects do not necessarily depend on hard-wired or over-trained processes, what 
other processes might produce them? One possibility is the automatic retrieval of episodic 
representations from memory (e.g., Hintzman, 1988; Logan, 1988; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Rothermund, 
2016).  For instance, when instructed ‘X’left, an episodic trace of this event might be stored in 
memory. When the letter ‘X’ is presented later, the episodic trace is automatically retrieved, resulting in 
a bias to press left. The suggestion is compatible with recent findings (Pfeuffer, Moutsopoulou, Pfister, 
Waszak, & Kiesel, 2017) that merely watching the SR association without needing to execute it may 
cause a form of AEI.  For representations supporting AEI, it may thus be sufficient that participants 
attend to certain aspects of the information.  This conclusion further implies that, contrary to the 
popular dichotomy between control and automaticity, attentional control may enable automatic 
processing, in line with Moors’s (2016) recent theory of automaticity.  
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Many questions remain unanswered such as what is the relationship between skill-based 
automaticity and AEI (Braem et al., 2017) and what are the relative constraints, advantages and 
disadvantages of each form of automaticity?  Recent research on the neural basis of rapid learning from 
instructions (Cole, Laurent, & Stocco, 2013) should also be extended to explain AEI (Brass, Liefooghe, 
Braem, & De Houwer, in press; Cole, et al., in press). 
In sum, research on AEI challenges the widespread conception of automaticity as requiring hard-
wired or over-trained processes. It is, however, in line with models emphasizing the role of episodic 
memory retrieval. 
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